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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
	rable Joseph C. Spero, Chief Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
Plaintiff,)
VS.) Case No. 3:23-MC-80029-JCS
PAYWARD VENTURES, INC.,)
Defendants.)))
	San Francisco, California Friday, June 9, 2023

TRANSCRIPT OF REMOTE PROCEEDINGS HEARING ON PETITION TO ENFORCE SUMMONS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

APPEARANCES ON THE NEXT PAGE.

TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE BY:

Dipti Patel, CET-997 Liberty Transcripts 7306 Danwood Drive Austin, Texas 78759 (847) 848-4907

APPEARANCES VIA ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE:

For the Plaintiff:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1275 1st Street NE, Room 9110

Washington, D.C. 20002

BY: AMY MATCHISON, ATTORNEY AT LAW

For the Defendants:

GOODWIN & PROCTER LLP 601 Marshall Street

Redwood City, California 94063

BY: GRANT P. FONDO, ATTORNEY AT LAW

GOODWIN & PROCTER LLP

601 South Figueroa Street, Suite 4100

Los Angeles, California 90017

BY: AMANDA RUSSO, ATTORNEY AT LAW

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Friday - June 9, 2023

9:43 a.m.

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PROCEEDINGS

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4 THE CLERK: The next matter we're calling is 23-MC-80029, 5 United States of America versus Payward Ventures. Counsel, 6

Ms. Russo. There we go.

Good morning. Appearances, please, first starting with the Government, and then the defendant.

could you please raise your hands? Judge, I have one more,

MS. MATCHISON: Good morning, Your Honor. Amy Matchison for the United States.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. FONDO: Good morning, Your Honor. Grant Fondo for Payward.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. RUSSO: Good morning, Your Honor. Amanda Russo for Payward Ventures, as well.

THE COURT: Good morning. Good morning, and thank you all for the briefing in this case. I think the next time I do it, I'll change the order of the briefing. But I think we got to the place where we can have a good discussion about it.

As you'll see from my questions, I'm puzzled about pieces of this, and this application, and fairly clear on others. But to start with something elementary because I think I need to do it as a predicate is the motion to seal, motions to

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seal, Dockets 29 and 26.

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The only support I have for the motion to seal is a conclusory declaration by Counsel that there's an increased security risk in Counsel's understanding. I will note that in the <u>Coinbase</u> case, there was no motion to seal. I'm inclined to deny the motion to seal unless there's -- unless you can convince me that there's a really good reason why the things that you want sealed are sealed.

At this stage in the case, it has to be a compelling reason because this is a dispositive motion. And it just seemed to me, in just looking through it, I didn't really understand what the compelling reason was looking through it just from what I know about the procedures of these companies.

But I wanted to give you a chance now to try to convince me that there was a good reason to seal. And so you can, if you would like to.

MS. RUSSO: Your Honor, this is Amanda Russo on behalf of Payward Ventures. The one thing we would highlight for the Court is the fact that cyber security risk has been viewed in this court and other courts as a compelling reason justifying sealing.

And particularly in cases like this involving cryptocurrency, exchanges or companies, there's an increased risk or more significant consequences that might result from a cyber security risk. In this case, you know, you're not just

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inviting cyber securities to steal personal information or credit card numbers or Social Security numbers, but rather there's an added risk and a more significant risk that those cyber security hackers could in fact actually transfer assets, additional assets to themselves or others.

So for that reason, we would just -- we wanted to flag that further reason and stress the importance of the sealing of this information relating to the IT capabilities and functionality.

THE COURT: So that's not an adequate reason by itself. It is the first line in a three-page explanation of the details of why there is a particular risk in this case because what you're saying is any case, all information in any case regarding a cryptocurrency exchange has to be put under seal, all of it because it's the cryptocurrency exchange, all information regarding Bank of America, any time I have a Bank of America case.

The question is whether or not there are particular things that are being disclosed in this case that present a compelling reason to seal. And so it is the same as the declaration.

So unless you can come up with an explanation of why particular things, not any time we deal with a cryptocurrency exchange, any time we deal with taxes, any time we deal with something that can be transferred. You know, it's not

adequate. So I don't know exactly how you want to proceed on that. But if that's the entirety of the explanation, I would deny the motion to seal.

MS. RUSSO: Understood, Your Honor. And in this case, we're specifically seeking to seal very limited actually information relating to their IT processes. And the storage of that information within Kraken's systems, and Kraken's ability to actually analyze and pull that information.

So for instance, whether or not data's encrypted or not encrypted in a certain scenario, whether or not they're capable of searching for various pieces of data within their systems which indicates to a third party potentially where those data are located within Kraken's internal systems.

And so here, we're just focused on the IT processes and capabilities within Kraken which are proprietary to Kraken and confidential and not shared publicly with the outside.

THE COURT: Okay. That's not adequate on its face.

You're going to need to do more. I'll give you an opportunity to do more if you want. And you will have to go line by line, entry by entry through everything you want redacted from the public record to say why that particular information will result in a particular increased cybersecurity risk.

And it's got to be -- and it can't be your declaration or your argument. It has to be an internal security person who knows the systems and is an expert on it, or your external

expert or whatever it is. It's got to be an expert describing exactly what the language is in the brief and tracing why it presents a security risk.

And I know that, you know, why in the <u>Coinbase</u> matter didn't you move to seal anything there? I mean that, I think, was this firm's case. But as I recall, why didn't you move to seal anything in the Coinbase matter? It was the same issue?

MR. FONDO: Your Honor, this is Grant Fondo for Payward Ventures. I'm happy to address that if you --

THE COURT: Yeah, would you?

MR. FONDO: Yeah. So one is I don't have a definitive answer. It was a long time ago. And, you know, every client is different, the information that's being provided is different.

So what I would say is I understand Your Honor's concern or question as to why wasn't it sealed then. But it's a different time, different client, different -- some different information being provided.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, it's -- I'm --

MR. FONDO: Maybe (indiscernible), but --

THE COURT: Sure. No, go ahead. I mean, maybe, maybe not. I don't know. But I'll give you an opportunity to supplement. When did you want to provide the supplemental affidavit about this interest?

MS. RUSSO: Would a week from today, Your Honor, work?

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THE COURT: Sure. Yeah. Okay. And that was the easy questions. So this is really a question for Kraken again. So the registration and verification requirements when somebody signs up for an account, are those the same for the express account as the starter account, because I didn't see particular references to the express account which seems to be an, and I don't know the differences, but a slightly different level of account than the starter account.

MR. FONDO: Sure, Your Honor. So one, the differences in the accounts are based on jurisdictional issues more than certain practical issues. As to the starter account, all of them that they have starter or express have the email, full name, date of birth, phone number, physical address, generally.

The express, and some of this varies depending on the time period. But the express also does have occupational information and Social Security IDs as well, more recently.

THE COURT: When was that? So through the entire period, they have that basic information you talk about, name, address, email address, that sort of thing. At some point, you're saying express added a Social Security and occupation.

MR. FONDO: Correct.

THE COURT: And when was that?

MR. FONDO: I'm not certain as to the exact time, Your Honor.

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if you do, there are really only two factors at issue, the

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legitimate purpose and the relevancy factors.

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I sweep into those the issue of whether it's a narrowly-tailored under that section, statute that applies to John Doe summonses. But, and the first thing I wanted to talk to you about is one that I'm, I think, legitimately confused about. And I think its, I don't know if it falls under legitimate purpose or falls under relevancy.

But the issue, and I'll just ramble on for a little bit and then you can respond, is this. What is necessary in the context of a group John Doe summons, which is this, you know, seeking information on a group of taxpayers from a provider. What is necessary to show that there is a non-speculative basis for believing that the information sought will shed light on whether there's a failure to comply with the law.

And you know, there's so many parts to that. What is the particular -- what does the showing have to be in terms of the kind of particular failure to comply with the law. Does the showing have to be as to the group? It's on the first one, question about the showing about a particular in the <u>Coinbase</u>, United States kind of lasered in on a particular failure to pay tax on gain.

And from that, one could -- and it presented specifically evidence on the failure of people on the cryptocurrency exchange to report capital gains based on purchase and sale of the crypto assets. And that led the judge to conclude, so in

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terms of figuring out what is a reasonable, non-speculative bases, and going from that to the scope.

So there was -- once there was a taxpayer ID and once all the transactions were disclosed, United States had -- could have enough information to laser in on particular taxpayers and perhaps issue further subpoenas. But that there was a particular showing about the failure of this group to do -- to report capital gains, and why there might be gains on these transactions.

On the other hand, in this case the United States is giving I think a much more general description, a laundry list of potential. I don't mean that necessarily as a criticism, but a lot of potential violations without any particular showing aimed at showing this group of taxpayers is likely to commit those particular violations.

You know, it strikes me this is like -- one argument is that doing a laundry list of violations without showing anything in particular about this group of taxpayers as to those particular violations other than saying well, this group -- well, there's two things about it. One is I'm not sure whether it is adequate to show a realistic, non-speculative basis with respect to a group to get all their personal information to say that this group is more likely to commit Internal Revenue code violations. So that's a fundamental question.

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And the way I think about it, you know, because I'm old and I'm trying to ground myself in something I'm much more familiar with, is you know, if it's much more likely that the taxpayers in a particular area code, particular zip code are likely to commit tax violations, you could probably figure that out. You know, just go to a neighborhood, figure out the wealth factor in the neighborhood, figure out how many people actually filed tax returns in the neighborhood, and draw an inference in relationship to the tax filing rates in other neighborhoods as to whether a particular neighborhood is much more likely to commit Internal Revenue code violations.

Or people using a particular bank, you could probably get information that would say that taxpayers using a particular bank are more likely to commit Internal Revenue code violation. And this is -- some of this information, because it's not very particularized, is like that. You know?

Few people declare cryptocurrency assets on their tax returns. I mean, that's the gist of the IRS's showing here. And my fundamental question is whether that's adequate. You know, it is — it strikes me as a little bit of saying well, you know, the people live in this particular town aren't filing their tax returns at the same rate, in fact a tenth of the rate of some other town, but there's a lot of income in that town.

So give us the information on everybody in that town. I

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want taxpayer IDs, I want to know whoever it is. And so I'm going to subpoena City Hall or subpoena a bank in that neighborhood.

So I'm a little concerned that this is just, you know, while there is the John Doe summons that Congress authorized, and the Powell test in the context of a group is a different animal. And so my fundamental question that I want to talk to you about is that one.

You know, and then if it's -- and another way of thinking about it is if you can apply it to a group, what does it mean. Does it mean that there's a -- if it's likely that someone in the group committed a violation, I mean, you've got 59,000 or 56,000 taxpayers subject to the current subpoena.

It's nearly 100 percent likely that someone in that 56,000 committed an Internal Revenue code violation. My guess is if you subpoenaed 56,000 people anywhere, it's nearly 100 percent likely that there's an Internal Revenue code violation in that 56,000. I'd be very interested in what the overall rate is of violation when you do these sorts of subpoenas.

But is that the test, that if there's anyone in the group? Or does it have to be something much more substantial than that?

And then finally, in the course of answering this question, I really would like to know from the service what is the focus of this investigation. What is the violation or

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violations that they are really focusing on, and what is the evidence that the group as a whole is likely to have committed those violations.

So that's my -- it's the beginning of the relevancy, but it's more, it's focused also on whether there's a legitimate purpose because you know, but I'm wondering under either standard why -- whether we're -- what's necessary to show that there's a realistic, non-speculative basis for leaving the information that will shed light on violations in the context of a group summons like that.

It's not, I mean, I know people have enforced these.

Judge Corely did, others have. Few of them have been contested the way the ones, Coinbase and this one have. But I just, I haven't seen a satisfactory explanation for why it actually works in this context.

So I think I'll start with the service on this question because it's your burden, and I'm interested in what you think about it.

MS. MATCHISON: Thank you, Your Honor. I think I'll first start with, you know, John Doe summonses aren't a frequent vehicle device seen by courts. And so I'm going to go ahead and take it apart a little bit.

So before the IRS can issue a John Doe summons, we have to apply to a district court to review our ex-parte application to make several determinations. And there's

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currently four. There used to be three, but now there's four.

And those determinations are whether first, the summons relates to the investigation of an ascertainable group or class, meaning can we identify a class. Second, that there is a reasonable basis for believing that U.S. persons who conducted such transactions failed or may have failed to report income to the IRS.

The third is whether or not the information is readily available to the IRS. And a fourth one is the new requirement that was added after Coinbase which is that the summons requests need to be narrowly tailored.

And it seems to me some of your questions are hitting on that second prong there, which is whether or not there's a reasonable basis for believing that U.S. persons may have failed to report income, essentially. The first thing I will say is this, is that the jurisprudence is clear that once the Court has made a determination on the ex-parte application, that those factors cannot later be challenged in an enforcement proceeding.

THE COURT: So I take you out on that. In this case, I reserved on that. So whatever the jurisprudence is, I specifically carved it out in my order. Now, maybe that means you have an improper order and we go back to square one, and I'll reissue the summons after a contested proceeding. In fact, I was tempted to do that in the first instance. But

instead, I just reserved on that.

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So whatever the jurisprudence is, and I actually think you're incorrect on the jurisprudence, but we don't need to get into it, I reserved on that. So I'm going to decide those issues.

MS. MATCHISON: Okay.

THE COURT: So let's move on to what does it mean that you have a reasonable basis in the group context.

MS. MATCHISON: What it means, Your Honor, is that the IRS has identified a compliance problem. And certainly, the IRS has not identified a compliance problem with every one of the what we now know to be 50,000-some individuals that are in the John Doe group.

But what the IRS has done is identified that in the area of cryptocurrency, for various reasons, cryptocurrency is being under reported to the IRS. How did the IRS establish this, how did they discover this?

Well, they did look at tax return information and they determined that based upon what they saw in the market and what the numbers were from the exchanges and what the numbers were being touted in the press, that cryptocurrency activity was being grossly under reported, or at least it seemed so. I know there's some list statistics, you've seen them in the papers.

THE COURT: So why is that enough? Why is that enough?

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My example of, you know, the people who live in a particular wealthy community under report at rate that's a report or file tax returns, it's a rate of ten percent of what you would like.

Now, why isn't this, you know, those sort of overarching things about an industry? What does that got to do with this is the particular, I mean, first of all, this isn't -- you haven't subpoenaed the industry, nor could you. This isn't a subpoena to a particular group of taxpayers, number one.

And I'm not sure that just showing the industry under reports at a particular rate means that is sufficient. That's question number one. Number two is that why isn't this like going after a town? You know? This particular group is in a -- under reports because they are in a town that under reports.

And so it is because the town under reports, we get everybody in the town's individual private information, banks, you know, all that sort of thing. So you understand my point, I'm sure.

MS. MATCHISON: Yes, Your Honor. And I would go back to it's not just the tax return information. The IRS has also identified that in general, when there's no third-party reporting requirement involved, that taxpayers under report. And that's been seen over a various number of industries, not just certainly this one. But that's another piece of

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information that the IRS brings in identifying this compliance problem.

I think to your example of why not just, you know, summons an entire townspeople, you know, everybody in a town may not be engaged in the same financial activity that has been identified as having suffering from a compliance problem. And we're not saying everyone's trying to evade tax that's --

THE COURT: Well, and so banks, I mean, you know, there's going to be some group like what I'm talking about. It may be a town. It may be that there's similar enough financial activity within a town.

But everybody who banks within a particular bank and withdraws and deposits money in a particular bank, and we know that there's a compliance problem with people who actually put their money in this particular bank. Or I'm just wondering why it is because all of your stats are very high level. They are industry level. They're not this particular group of Kraken customers.

MS. MATCHISON: Sure. I'll --

THE COURT: It's just the industry. And so if you have an industry, what you're saying I guess is if you have an industry where there's -- it looks like from 40,000 feet there's a compliance problem, and you -- therefore you can get the detailed information that you get in a John Doe summons from anybody who participates in that industry, right?

MS. MATCHISON: I mean, historically the John Doe summonses have operated in that way. I would add a couple of other things, Your Honor. John Doe --

THE COURT: That's not my question. My question is -historically is historically. Yes, I understand they've been
enforced that way. What's the legal justification for
applying this, the test that is laid out by the Ninth Circuit
and by the statutes for that way of approaching it? Because
you participate in an industry where there's under reporting,
we get all your stuff.

MS. MATCHISON: I believe that's in the statute, Your Honor. That's the John Doe summons statute. That's what Congress has decided is the IRS's mechanism to deal with problems like this.

THE COURT: No, it's not.

MS. MATCHISON: And I would add that --

THE COURT: It's not. It's not. It's not because that's too high-level. Again, because you're ignoring the question that you posed. What in this context is necessary to show a reasonable basis in the group context. That's part number two. Why is it necessary. Why is it just anybody who participates in this industry?

MS. MATCHISON: Your Honor, I have a few other things. First, the banks are subject to reporting requirements. So the IRS does get information from banks. IRS also does use

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John Doe summonses to banks.

But I would like to go back to the regional basis. First of all, we have -- in addition to the tax return data and the third-party reporting problems, we have the results from Coinbase, the results from Coinbase that indicated that there actually was under reporting, and that some people, for various reasons, did fail to properly comply with the Internal Revenue laws.

And then I think fourth is in the original ex-parte application and supporting declaration, I believe there were five examples specific to Kraken of Kraken users. Now, I understand 5 is not 50-some thousand. But there were specific examples of people who were using Kraken services who had either failed to report income or failed to report cryptocurrency gains, something along those lines.

And so certainly, Your Honor, there is not an individual piece of information or knowledge on the part of the IRS about all some 50,000 John Doe class members here. However, all of those — all of that information about the compliance problem that led the IRS to conclude there was in fact a compliance problem as it relates to cryptocurrency came from all these various factors.

THE COURT: Okay. So can you cite to me the five examples? I mean, I just need a record cite so I can look at this. And I'm not --

MS. MATCHISON: That would have been in the ex-parte action.

THE COURT: Sure. If you could just give me a docket number.

MS. MATCHISON: Yeah. So it would be Docket I think it's 1-2. Let me get to that. Let me see if I can get those paragraphs for you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Great.

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MS. MATCHISON: I believe it's Paragraphs 70 through 74.

THE COURT: Whose declaration is this?

MS. MATCHISON: This is, I'm sorry, it's the declaration of Karen Cincotta in support of the ex-parte application.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MATCHISON: And there's also two additional examples from criminal cases included at Exhibit, I'm sorry, included at Paragraph 76 and 77.

THE COURT: Criminal cases involving Kraken users?

MS. MATCHISON: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me get Kraken to respond to what you said because we are talking about sort of basic level stuff.

Why isn't it enough that we know there's a massive under reporting problem of cryptocurrency transactions that the experience when we actually go through, when the IRS actually goes through with one of these demonstrates the truth of that

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with respect to Coinbase, that there are some examples in specific with respect to Kraken. What, why isn't that enough, and how could the IRS possibly get anything more than that before issuing the summons?

MR. FONDO: Your Honor, a couple points. One is to your point. This is a vast net that connects 59,000 users. So it would not be surprising, I don't know what the national statistics are failure to pay income tax, but it would not be surprising that a percentage of those people do not pay taxes.

And I think that goes to the narrower point. You can't just bring in a big net and just grab everything because there's going to be a few in there or a percentage in there. Nor have they identified why Kraken is different than the industry. And in fact, there are different aspects of this industry. So there's not --

THE COURT: Well, this is -- but you're under playing what they say. What they say is there's nearly 100 percent non-reporting. You know, out of millions and millions of transactions, of taxpayers involved in these things, and billions of dollars as an industry, the amount of reporting is fewer than, you know, in some years it's been, pre-Coinbase, fewer than 10,000 or fewer than 20,000 taxpayers, still under a million taxpayers despite many, many, many, many millions of dollars of transactions in these which resulted in something.

And no reporting, not even -- it's not a matter of

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whether there's income. It's a matter of whether there's reporting even. And so it's not -- you under play the results. It's dramatic. It's not like some, you know, the IRS can show that 28 percent or 42 percent of taxpayers don't file tax returns.

This is, you know, in some years nearly 100 percent. In other years less than 100 percent, but dramatic. So it's -- why isn't that a sufficient inference that it -- that most of the group or a lot of the group, not just five examples, it's a reasonable inference that this will bear on a potential violation because they don't have to show a violation. They just have to show some non-speculative basis. And why doesn't that show a non-speculative basis. That's the question.

MR. FONDO: Your Honor, a couple points. So one, those numbers have changed over time. So when the Coinbase decision was being made, those numbers were much less. They just, according to the IRS's own numbers, the filing of tax returns on crypto has increased over time.

THE COURT: To what in terms of -- I mean, how many people engage in buying and selling of crypto assets, I guess selling is the key, in a given year? How many people, 50 million, 100 million, 75 million?

MR. FONDO: Yeah. I don't --

THE COURT: Certainly tens of millions. Eight hundred thousand declared at the highest number, or nine hundred

thousand declared something about crypto on their tax returns. Isn't that still a very small percentage of the number of people who actually engage in the industry from a U.S. taxpayer's perspective, I suppose, in buying and selling of crypto assets?

MR. FONDO: So one, I would say that is a number that goes across all aspects of buying and selling crypto. It does not go across as to exchanges. So exchanges, people are going — because you can by and sell crypto assets without going through an exchange.

THE COURT: What percentage of crypto assets go through exchanges --

MR. FONDO: I don't know.

THE COURT: -- in terms of buying and selling? Well, okay. Is there any evidence that a significant portion don't go through exchanges, because the instinct would be that most of them would go through exchanges, in terms of numbers of transactions, at least.

MR. FONDO: So I would do two things. One, number of transactions and volume because obviously the industry has certain players that are much higher in volume and take up a large volume. So, Your Honor, I honestly don't know, and I wouldn't want to speculate.

I would say this is an industry where one of the government, meaning other branches of the government,

concluded -- are concerned that there are private transactions that are not going on exchanges. I don't have an estimate for Your Honor as to what percentage go through exchanges or go through -- versus private transactions that are not on one of the major exchanges.

THE COURT: Okay. But we do know that there are, you know, quite literally hundreds of millions of transactions each year that go through exchanges, right?

MR. FONDO: Correct. But again, one person can do a, you know, 100,000 transactions if it's a hedge fund or a day trader, things like that.

THE COURT: So do you have evidence that it is a materially smaller number of individual taxpayers who are engaging these traders, these exchanges, purchase and selling of cryptocurrency, such that if the 800 or 900,000 taxpayers who actually declared it on their tax returns is significant? Do you have any evidence about what you're saying?

MR. FONDO: No. I do not have the percentages, Your Honor. What I can say is that for example just on the Kraken exchange, there are different categories of users based on different accounts. And I think there's an overgeneralization as so we take the starter ones or the express, are they more likely or less likely to not pay taxes than say the Pro which are businesses and tend to generate a lot more transactions. And I --

THE COURT: Are all Pros businesses? Pros are both businesses and individuals.

MR. FONDO: Your Honor, Pro is business. It can be business and individuals, correct. But usually the individuals are people who tend -- it's higher net worth people who tend to do more transactions.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FONDO: The other thing I would say, Your Honor, as part of this analysis is, you know, that fourth factor under the statute says narrow. So again, it goes to the net example.

So even if you can establish that there is some suspicion that this particular either industry which I caution you on in the -- not caution, just say I think we have to be careful about because when you look at the McGee decision as well as the Humble Oil decision, slightly different factually, admittedly. But they talk about why are these types of individuals at this company more likely than anybody else that owns an oil (indiscernible) for example, not to pay taxes. And I don't think that IRS has necessarily identified that.

THE COURT: Can I --

MR. FONDO: But what I would also --

THE COURT: Before you get to the narrow one, talk about the Coinbase results. So we have an example, a real world example of an exchange. It was several years ago. So there's

that, and I'll grant you that.

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But what we have from the Coinbase results is there was, as a result of that, many, many, many taxpayers who, according to Counsel, didn't report when they had to. What about -- so you're probably familiar with the Coinbase results. Maybe you aren't. Why isn't that another data point, at least, on why it makes sense to infer with respect to exchanges that there's a significant portion of their customers are not reporting?

MR. FONDO: So one, I would say, Your Honor, that was, that time period took place at a nascent stage in this industry when there was lots of discussion about whether, or was there any obligation to pay taxes at that point. Clearly, that has changed, and sort of the regulatory oversight over the industry has changed.

So I think in a rapidly-evolving industry, in a rapidly-evolving regulatory environment, I think it is harder to make that comparison when you go back to what was really the beginning stages of the industry. And so I think even the IRS's numbers show that compliance has gone up over time.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So, go on. You were going to talk about the narrow, the factor I've narrowly drawn.

MR. FONDO: Yeah. The other thing I would say is that not only do you have the Powell factors in the narrow. So what we would argue is yes, if you bring this net through, you're going to grab some people that did not pay their taxes.

We don't dispute that. I'm sure they will, they will find some.

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The question is, is it narrowly tailored to the types of people that may not pay their taxes versus just everybody.

And what I would say is I don't think they have met that burden when they are sweeping in 59,000 users. In addition, under the Coopers and Livern (phonetic) case, the summons is deemed unreasonable if it's overbroad and disproportionate to the end sought.

So in that context, too, 59,000 users, how many are you going to get. How much, you know, are these low users, are they big users. You look at the numbers. Many of the users are smaller users. What percentage of those don't pay taxes verus the larger users.

The IRS hasn't identified that. So they've taken every --

THE COURT: So it's not just -- let's focus on reporting because paying taxes depends on the results.

MR. FONDO: Fair enough, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But as long as there's any gain, a dollar or a million dollars, there's a reporting obligation. So what you're saying is there's no differentiation among users in terms of whether or not they're likely to have transaction resulting in gain?

MR. FONDO: Correct, Your Honor. And frankly, a gain

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that the IRS would go after. I mean, I don't -- you know, there's a reason --

THE COURT: Well, but that's up to them. I mean, we can talk about whether some of this stuff is overbroad. But in general, that's up to them, right? I mean, if they had the resources, they could go after anybody.

MR. FONDO: Yes, that is up to them. But I'm being practical, too, particularly when you're looking at the burden. Like, so I think if you ask -- like, is it fair to have Kraken turn over all this information on users that they will not go after? I would say no. Now, I realize they will not make --

THE COURT: See, that fits for me in a different bucket.

I think it's fair for them to examine anyone who they have a reasonable basis for believing might not be complying with the Internal Revenue code. Whether I like it or not, it's permitted.

The question is whether or not, and it really goes to legitimate purpose. If they get all this data and they can't possibly use it because it's too much, I mean, this goes to the IP address history, it seems really unlikely they're going to go through the IP address history of 59,000 people. They don't have the people power to do that, or other things that they're asking for.

Does that bear on legitimate purpose? And maybe at some

point we can ask the service to respond to that. But I think that they're allowed to, just as a legal matter, they're allowed to, you know, investigate anyone who they reasonably believe is not reporting, even if it's a small taxpayer.

It's, you know, they have their priorities. And the priorities don't necessary include those kinds of individuals. And I think that makes sense from a policy perspective. From a legal perspective, it's up to them.

MR. FONDO: Well, if I could address that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. FONDO: I think the Court just said maybe not. And what I mean by that is if you look at the <u>Humble Oil</u> decision, information sought by a summons can be relevant and material, which is what you've just identified, but yet so burdensome to produce that enforcement should be denied. Likewise, the disproportionate standard which is related in the <u>Coopers</u> matter.

So what I would say to you, Your Honor, is that if -- I don't know what the IRS standards are, just like every federal criminal district has standards about what they will and will not prosecute. I don't know what the IRS standards are. But if there are standards that they would not likely seek information, and this information is burdensome, et cetera, I would argue that's disproportionate.

THE COURT: See, I don't -- well, I mean, I guess if you

could show that they won't be using it for a proper purpose, that is to say they're just grabbing it and they're not going to use it, that that would question the legitimacy of that portion of the investigation. I guess that's what -- is that essentially what you're saying?

MR. FONDO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FONDO: As to your specific question. I would still argue that there is disproportionality even to the users that they might go after. But that's to address your specific question.

THE COURT: Understood. Understood, understood. Well,
maybe I should go back to -- did you want to say something
else? I want to get a response from the service on this. But
do you want to say something else on this general area we're
talking about?

MR. FONDO: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Maybe I could hear from Counsel for the Government in response to those points, and particularly the last point, that there's no differentiation, no narrowing to -- no differentiation between users that are likely to not report from those who are not likely -- are likely to report, not unlikely to report. And that runs afoul of the requirement, the disproportionality or the narrowing requirements in that -- number one.

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And number two, I'd like you to respond to the Coinbase point, that that was a long time ago when this industry was at the very beginning when everybody was trying to figure out everything, it's a tiny fraction of the volume back then. You know, I was surprised that the, I mean, the numbers that, I mean Coinbase is huge right now, a giant exchange.

Nonetheless, even what was allowed last time only allowed -- went to 10 or 15,000 taxpayers. But so the Coinbase point that it's at the beginning stages of the industry, so the results you got many, many years ago are not relevant, especially considering, you know, just the evidence of additional and more common reporting of trading cryptocurrency assets. Go ahead.

MS. MATCHISON: Yes, Your Honor. So I think, so first to that narrowly tailoring, and it seems like that discussion from Kraken is focused a lot on the types of people that may not pay their taxes. But that's a hard judgment for the IRS to make standing in isolation with no information, right? Maybe it seems reasonable to say that people that make more money are less likely to report their gains because they're hiding it.

I don't know. They could also be more likely to hire professionals that would make sure that they are consistently reporting their gains and their income consistent with the Internal Revenue laws.

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THE COURT: Plus, I don't know how you do that differentiation without getting more information than even you're asking for that I'm going to allow from them. I mean, I guess if you got the internal -- if you got their tax ID numbers and identified them, you could see who's filed a return and the kind of income they have filed.

MS. MATCHISON: Well, and that's exactly why -- and we can get to this, you know, certainly later. But that's exactly why the IRS has asked for the information they've asked for is that they can identify a taxpayer, look to see if they filed returns at all, if they did file returns, what they reported, and if that -- what they reported is consistent with other information that the IRS might have.

But, you know, I think also too that, you know, people that are in any one year engaging in cryptocurrency activity up to a level of \$20,000, like, that's not a small amount of money. That's not a small user, right? Like, these are people that are doing real dollars.

And there is no -- Congress has not put any sort of de minimis exception when it comes to cryptocurrency. I know the industry has urged Congress to do that. Congress has not done that. And so even drawing the line at 20,000, there's probably people out there that are not going to be detected at that level, right, again acknowledging that the IRS can't go after everybody, and that Kraken shouldn't have to give a

piece of information for every single one of its users.

THE COURT: I see. Okay.

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MS. MATCHISON: I don't know if -- you know, even if the IRS doesn't audit every single person for which they receive information, they do in essence touch every one of those people. But there's different treatment streams, right? So they might look at a person and they might say yeah, this person merits an audit. Let's put them under exam.

They might look at the person's return and the information they have and they say you know what, this person might be all right. Let's just issue them an education letter to make sure they understand their obligations that they're supposed to be reporting cryptocurrency transactions as either income or as real property.

They might issue just an education letter reminding them hey, look, you failed to report that you had crypto and that's part of the form now. So in the future, you need to check the box to say you actually have crypto.

Or alternatively, they could take no action. If they take a look at the return, if they take a look at the information, they determine it looks like they've complied, they take no action. And that's exactly as they should do.

But the IRS uses this information, but that does not necessarily mean that every person is placed under exam, nor should they be. That's not always the result of more

information.

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I think it came up, you know, would the IRS really go through all the IP address information. Probably not, Your Honor. They probably wouldn't need to, right? The IP address information is one more piece of information the IRS might need to determine someone's identity positively.

The IRS requires three pieces of information in order to make a positive ID. They don't always get enough information with the basic name, date of birth, TIN, or physical address that they got in Coinbase to actually make that identification.

In addition, some of the foreign exchange information they get, foreign cryptocurrency exchanges in other countries, IRS receives some of that information, they use IP address quite a bit. And so if we don't have that IP address information, we may be failing to connect some dots.

THE COURT: Well, let's look at -- we'll get to the details of this. I know this is really a much more generalized discussion. But, you know, the issue for that to me is not whether there is some relevance, but the degree to which you need it and whether or not, you know, getting it for all of these people when you'll use it in three cases is disproportionate. But --

MS. MATCHISON: The one other point I wanted to get to is the fact that, you know, Coinbase is a long time ago. And so

maybe the results --

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THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. MATCHISON: -- of, you know, a Kraken, you know, John Doe summons case will not be the same as Coinbase. I would just say that even though it was, you know, closer to the beginning of the Coinbase boom, you know, we've now seen a boom. There has been a larger uptick. More people are using crypto, and they're using it in more and different ways.

People are being paid wages in cryptocurrency. People are buying things on retail websites in cryptocurrency. So just because that was at the beginning, I think that now you have more users in the marketplace, and therefore there could be less compliance. I think also too --

THE COURT: Well, but that's -- you're not disputing the point that the actual results which you said which was from Coinbase we know --

MS. MATCHISON: Right.

THE COURT: -- that a significant percentage of those people were not reporting. We can't, from that, infer that the same percentage or even a similar percentage are non-reporting now because it was so long ago and in a different context.

MS. MATCHISON: Certainly, Your Honor. But I do think that there are more users now, and the market, the crypto market has been more valuable. So those factors may actually

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indicate it could be, you know, there could be less
compliance. I don't know.

I mean, certainly if Kraken could tell us how many of its users were properly reporting, we would take that. But that's not their job. Right? That's not what they're doing. That's not their business model. They're not in the business of determining whether or not their users are, you know, complying with their reporting obligations.

So we can't get that information. And so since we can't, we stand in a position that's, you know, a bit of a deficit in knowledge. And this is how we fill that gap, right, get information. We look at it and --

THE COURT: No, I understand.

MS. MATCHISON: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to move on to the specifics now. Definition of user, you know, I guess I'm in generally inclined to go along with the definition of user. But I have a couple of questions. First one is to the United States. Is there something different about Kraken users as opposed to Coinbase users that explains why you're casting a wider net than what you ended up with in Coinbase?

MS. MATCHISON: So, you know, we used a different definition from the John Doe class, Your Honor. And it wasn't with the, necessarily the intention to cast a wider net. It just I think because again, market uptake and factors that

have changed, but the numbers wound up being different.

But what we did change that previously we defined it as being a user with \$20,000 in any one category during the years at issue in either buy, send, seller, receive.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. MATCHISON: Well, Kraken doesn't use those terms, buy, send, seller, received. Those are kind of like specialized Coinbase terms. And so as the IRS is understanding of the cryptocurrency market has evolved, it has realized that when it issued summonses to Kraken and other cryptocurrency businesses, which it has, it has stricken that buy, send, sell, receive because it simply just doesn't apply.

I think also, too, the IRS's understanding has evolved and it's understanding how people are using crypto and, you know, how it has increased in popularity. You know, they understand that more now. And so because of that, they changed it, as well.

THE COURT: Well, why did you change the aggregation number?

MS. MATCHISON: To reflect the fact that more users were likely using cryptocurrency. But honestly mostly it's because the buy, send, sell, receive simply doesn't translate to businesses outside of Coinbase.

THE COURT: Well, but that's not about the aggregation.

The aggregation number, it makes no sense to say well, we

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changed it because more people are using it. The aggregation number is designed to set a level at which you're going to investigate.

But whether there's a million users or five, it's to set a level. And the fact that there are more users doesn't mean that that level is no longer appropriate. It just means there's more people over that level, more people under that level.

So I really don't understand why you went, changed from saying it's got to be an individual transaction, one transaction of at least \$20,000 in any particular year, whatever the transaction was. I'm not worried about what the kind of transaction is.

Went from that to saying if cumulatively your transactions add up to \$20,000 in a particular year, that's in this case a difference of, I don't know, 10 or 20,000 taxpayers, according to the Kraken numbers I think that were in one of those declarations, maybe 10 or 15,000 taxpayers. So I'm wondering why, what it is about it that justifies that difference.

MS. MATCHISON: Well, I think a couple things. So first of all, the Coinbase definition wasn't for one transaction. It was for one type of transaction. And so a person could have had multiple buys in one year. It wasn't just that one -- you had to buy at least once over \$20,000. It was if you

bought \$20,000 worth.

So it wasn't just like one big fish kind of thing. I think also, you know, this wasn't done --

THE COURT: Well, okay. Just why did you go from that to what there is now?

MS. MATCHISON: I think just for simplicity's sake again because we didn't want to be limiting ourselves to miss out on any potential activity where people had failed to comply with reporting requirements. Right? I think that again, not tying it to buy, send, sell, receive, taking all of that out, then makes it easier for any recipient of the --

THE COURT: So you're not answering my question because that doesn't make any sense in terms of where you set the level. You could say that about in Coinbase you didn't want to miss out on any transactions, and so you set it at a particular level.

MS. MATCHISON: Well, I think the IRS kept it consistent at the \$20,000 level, Your Honor. It just changed the type of transactions that it would be considering in one year. And that really is based on the evolving understanding of the IRS --

THE COURT: No, it wasn't. It was not just the type of transactions. It was whether or not you had to add them together in any particular kind of transaction. In this, in Coinbase, you had to add them up. You had to have an

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individual sale, buy, send, whatever it is, et cetera, one of those that was \$20,000.

You don't have to have any of those, or any other kind of transaction that is \$20,000 to be subject to this subpoena.

You have to have, adding all of your transactions over the course of the year, \$20,000.

I'm wondering why the IRS changed its mind on what the level is. And you're not explaining to me what would justify that difference other than we just want it. Of course, you could have wanted it then, but you chose not to, presumably for policy reasons, and you resulted with a 99 percent taxpayer identification rate. So I'm not sure what we're talking about.

MS. MATCHISON: Well I think, you know, Your Honor, the way that the Coinbase user definition was set was as a result of conversations the United States had with Coinbase about their user base. So that was very much a tailor-made for the Coinbase summons case.

That was not where the IRS started out with. That was after Coinbase sat down with the Government and kind of went over the user base and the numbers. And there was a natural breaking point at that. And so that's why the Government changed the definition to reflect what we learned directly from Coinbase about their user base.

And then moving forward, the IRS did drop that specific

language, and dropped the aggregation in each year, in part to make it simpler and in part to match what they understood to be --

THE COURT: So what's different about this, you know, Kraken's customer base from Coinbase's customer base that means we shouldn't do it that way?

MS. MATCHISON: That we shouldn't use the aggregation? Is that what you mean?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MS. MATCHISON: I think that the IRS just didn't want to define it to be certain types of transactions. They didn't want to use transaction types. So --

THE COURT: You're not answering my question. So you set a \$20,000 threshold, which is different from the one that's now. Forget about types of transactions. The \$20,000 threshold in the original, in Coinbase was there had to be a single transaction and in a year of a particular type that was \$20,000, whether it was a buy or a sell or something else.

And now it is adding them all together, in a particular type, perhaps, or something. Why did you go from a transaction to the others? You justified the way you did it in Coinbase by saying it was based on that particular user base. What's different about this user base?

MS. MATCHISON: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honor. I've done a poor job of explaining it. In Coinbase, it wasn't a single

transaction that had to be over \$20,000 that qualified you to be a class member. It was \$20,000 worth of transaction sin any one of those types. So you could have multiple buys that got you --

THE COURT: I see.

MS. MATCHISON: -- over the \$20,000 comp, not --

THE COURT: I see.

MS. MATCHISON: -- just one. You didn't need to have a single one. And I'm sorry for not making that clear in the first instance.

THE COURT: I see. So it's \$20,000 in any transaction type --

MS. MATCHISON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- in any one year.

MS. MATCHISON: That's correct.

THE COURT: And now it's \$20,000 in any transaction type in a year? It's the same?

MS. MATCHISON: It's a little bit -- it is still a little bit different, Your Honor, in that we've removed those types.

And so, you know, it gets added up.

So if you have, you know, I don't know, Kraken doesn't use these terms, but if you bought, you know, 10,000, and then you sold 5,000, and then you transferred 5,000 more, that would add up to 20,000 and that would get you into this class which before, in Coinbase, you would have had to have, you

know, 20,000 in any one of those transaction types, not a singular transaction but in any one of those transaction types to qualify you.

THE COURT: So the things -- so now you can add up all of the transactions when before you could only add up transactions in a particular area like all the buys, all the purchases, all the sales, all of the something elses.

MS. MATCHISON: Right.

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THE COURT: Okay. And I guess I'm -- therefore, I'm going back to my question. Why? I mean, you wanted to get rid of those definitions because they didn't seem to fit every kind of category. But there are purchases. Right? There are purchases of Coinbase, of crypto assets.

There are sales of crypto assets. There are other kinds of transactions which don't readily fit into purchase or sales. But there are purchases that do and there are sales that do. And so this still does lower the threshold. And I think Kraken did a -- expert did a job of describing what the consequence of that is. And my question is why lower the threshold.

MS. MATCHISON: Yes, Your Honor. I think, you know, as I explained before, first of all, the Coinbase definition was settled upon after discussions with Coinbase about their base. So, like, that wasn't meant to be the standard for all time for --

THE COURT: Well, I don't care whether it was. I'm asking why it's different. What is different about the Coinbase user base from those discussions that justifies this now?

MS. MATCHISON: What's different about the Coinbase user base, Your Honor, was just that that was the determination the IRS made based upon the evidence that was presented. And --

THE COURT: What was the evidence that was presented that was specifically different from the evidence that's presented now?

MS. MATCHISON: Well, Your Honor, the evidence that's presented now, up until, you know, the briefing that Kraken has provided was that the numbers would be very consistent with what Coinbase was. So it didn't seem until only just recently that these numbers would even differ.

THE COURT: Okay. So --

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MS. MATCHISON: And all of our discussions with --

THE COURT: You want to --

MS. MATCHISON: -- Kraken, we weren't aware --

THE COURT: All right. Now you are.

MS. MATCHISON: Okay.

THE COURT: Now you have the evidence.

MS. MATCHISON: Right.

THE COURT: What's different? Why should I do it differently?

MS. MATCHISON: Because this is the level at which the IRS has decided to investigate.

THE COURT: No, you can't do that. You have to justify it for me because we're talking about over breadth and narrowing.

MS. MATCHISON: Right.

THE COURT: So you have to justify it for me. You can't just say that's what we decided.

MS. MATCHISON: Well, I think that what I've said is that we decided that based upon what we understood about the industry, what we learned from Coinbase, and the IRS's approach to its investigation, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you have no specifics, not a single specific about this, the users in Kraken and how they might differ from the users in Coinbase or how the industry has changed that result in this specific change in the threshold? You have no specifics on that, right?

MS. MATCHISON: Well, Your Honor, I believe as we've explained, we've put this in our papers and as I've explained is that there are more users in the market now. And so we would expect to some extent that there would be greater levels. There's more value in the cryptocurrency market now. So we would expect that there are more users at a higher level. I'm not sure --

THE COURT: That's got nothing to do with my question.

There are 10,000 people that were swept in by this that wouldn't be swept in if we used the Coinbase definition. Why should I do that?

MS. MATCHISON: Because --

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THE COURT: Because those are small users. Those are smaller users. Those are people who wouldn't meet -- wouldn't have, in any particular type of transaction, \$20,000 in value in a year. Why should I sweep them in?

MS. MATCHISON: Because even if they -- even if they're just at the bare minimum of \$20,000 in one year, Your Honor, again, there's no de minimis exception for folks. And so if there's a --

THE COURT: So you're not -- if you're going to keep doing this, I'm just going to stop asking you questions. Mine is the differentiation between this situation and the Coinbase situation. What has changed? And you keep sidestepping the question. You want to answer it, I'll give you one last chance.

MS. MATCHISON: Okay. The best answer I have, Your Honor, is just the difference in the cryptocurrency market, how it's changed, how the value has changed, and how the user base has expanded. That's the best I can do for you.

THE COURT: Okay. The other question I had for you is about foreign privacy rights. So you say it in your briefing that some of this information is designed to help you decide

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not. And if there are, whether or not and how I should be

concerned about it.

MS. MATCHISON: Your Honor, from the United States' perspective, I think the information that the IRS has requested is all information that any user of Kraken is on notice that Kraken may have to disclose to the Government.

THE COURT: Well, so those --

MS. MATCHISON: There's no expectation of privacy in that information.

THE COURT: Well, this is not about United States expectations of privacy. This is about whether Kraken will run afoul of the GDPR by providing any of this information. The question is whether or not you believe that's correct or incorrect, and if not, why not. And where in the GDPR, if you think it's just the notices that say that that's sufficient, that what they've posted on their website is sufficient.

MS. MATCHISON: Your Honor, I believe that Kraken might be better posed to answer whether or not they believe it would be in violation of their obligations under that --

THE COURT: Well, but they're going to say yes, it might be. They've already said yes, it might be.

MS. MATCHISON: And my response would be that all the information we're seeking to get from Kraken is information that their clients are aware, their users are aware they collect, and that they may be forced to turn over to the Government.

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50 THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that. Does that mean it's not a violation of the GDPR, in your opinion? Do you know? MS. MATCHISON: I don't know, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Let's --MS. MATCHISON: I'm not an expert. THE COURT: Assuming it is --I'm assuming it's not because it's MS. MATCHISON: information that they --THE COURT: So you don't --MS. MATCHISON: We believe --THE COURT: You actually don't have any -- so you don't have a clue as to whether it is because you can't -- you just said you don't know. But let's assume for the moment that they're correct and it is a violation of the GDPR. Can the IRS require someone to do something that's in violation of the GDPR in producing information to the IRS? MS. MATCHISON: Your Honor, I can't answer that question. I can certainly provide the Court with supplemental briefing on that if it needs it. THE COURT: Okay. Your Honor, if I may address that last point? MR. FONDO: THE COURT: Yeah, in a second. So why don't you address -- yeah, go ahead. You can address that last point. MR. FONDO: So, Your Honor, my understanding generally

with Government agencies is that just because the Government WWW.LIBERTYTRANSCRIPTS.COM

subpoenas it or otherwise seeks it, if there are GDPR issues, there are significant issues and it doesn't just -- the subpoena doesn't override the GDPR issue, generally. So I can't speak specifically to every IRS situation. But I think it's a legitimate and real concern having done this before.

THE COURT: Well, I don't understand why you say that because you don't have the slightest bit of evidence that that's true. You're just going to throw it off in one sentence or two sentences. Why doesn't the -- in my experience in dealing with the GDPR, that notice on the website may mean it's fine. The notice says --

MR. FONDO: I just --

THE COURT: -- we might have to turn it over because the Court says, we might have to turn it over because there's a summons or subpoena. So why doesn't that mean that there isn't any potential for a violation of the GDPR on this?

MR. FONDO: Because I don't think providing notice that says we might comply with the law is sufficient to override the GDPR.

THE COURT: Okay. And can you point to me the declaration that says that in this record?

MR. FONDO: We do not have that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. Hang on one second. On narrowly tailored, I take it that Kraken is really not objecting, other than sort of at the high level we've already

talked about which I understand, to the information contained in 1-A including email addresses. That's request number 1-A.

MR. FONDO: Correct. Yes. With those limitations you're correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. So I guess for the starter, express, and for some period of time the intermediate and pro, so before some period of 2019, taxpayer IDs were not collected as I understand it.

MR. FONDO: That's my understanding as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And for all those accounts, it did collect the date of birth, name, address, phone, email number, and then I guess for some of the accounts going forward during that period of time the high level accounts had the taxpayer ID.

And my question is why in terms of identifying the taxpayers, which seems to be the gist of the first three requests, why isn't that sufficient? I mean, that is you had terrific results in Coinbase using that.

And the, you know, if there are -- if you end up with a gap and then you can show we had this gap because we're missing the following information, we couldn't -- as to these few taxpayers, we need additional information to identify them. You can go back with another subpoena, why isn't that sufficient to do 1-A and not do the rest of, I mean, we can talk about 2 and 3, but why isn't the rest of 1 and then 2 and

3 overbroad, not sufficiently narrowed in terms of what you need right now to identify the taxpayers unless and until you can show that there are additional -- there are more problems, there are in fact more problems than identifying rather than just guessing that there might be problems. So this is to the service.

MS. MATCHISON: Your Honor, this is somewhat based on the lesson we learned from Coinbase in that there were, at the end of the day, 750 Coinbase John Doe class members that the service couldn't identify.

THE COURT: Out of 12,000?

MS. MATCHISON: Yes. So percentage-wise, it's not a huge amount, sure. But it's still 750 users --

THE COURT: So it was -- and what you needed was additional information on those 750 taxpayers, right?

MS. MATCHISON: That's correct. And because --

THE COURT: You didn't need information on the other 10,200 taxpayers, or 12,000 taxpayers.

MS. MATCHISON: That's correct, Your Honor. But because we couldn't identify them, we couldn't issue a summons to the taxpayer because we didn't know who they were. And we couldn't even issue a summons, a third-party summons to Coinbase and provide notice to the taxpayer because we didn't know who they were.

THE COURT: Well, you could do a John Doe summons to

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Coinbase aimed at those. Why didn't you go back and do another John Doe summons to Coinbase saying, justifying to the judge well now we've done everything you've said. We've got as much information -- we still have 750 accounts that we can't identify the taxpayers for. For those accounts, we need the following in order to identify because we have the following problem. With those specifics, why, how could you possibly say well we therefore need it on all 12,000?

MS. MATCHISON: You know, I think, Your Honor, part of the reason is the statute of limitations comes into play, as well as resource constraints.

THE COURT: Fine, yeah. Resource constraints, statute of limitations, I understand those are important. But it doesn't seem to me that it's inhibited you before. And it doesn't seem to me there's enough showing that it's inhibiting you now.

MS. MATCHISON: Well, I mean --

THE COURT: Plus, I've got to balance against over breadth which is you're going to get lots of information about people who have no additional obligations to the internal -- under the Internal Revenue code.

MS. MATCHISON: I would just note for the record that those 750 users from Coinbase that could not be identified were responsible for 100,000, or sorry, 100 million --

THE COURT: A hundred million, yes.

MS. MATCHISON: A hundred million in gross proceeds. So you know, although we can't quantify exactly what the consequence was to the U.S. Treasury, there likely was one.

THE COURT: Yeah, okay. I appreciate that. And this time, instead of waiting, you'll get the information and you'll issue a subpoena right away to get the information you can't do it instead of giving up. I mean, I don't understand why you said in your brief we couldn't go back and do -- you didn't say -- you didn't think of it, maybe. But whatever it is, you didn't go back and try to get more information.

I am strongly of the view that this step-wise approach is appropriate because you're having a group summons. And for most of them, the tiny bits of information you might get from the due diligence questionnaire for example, or from their IP addresses and that sort of thing, is completely unnecessary with respect to almost all of them.

So in terms of -- so I'm likely to reduce that. Let me ask you about requests four and five. So this information you're seeking in four and five is limited to records for the period of the summons. Is that right?

MS. MATCHISON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So for -- let me just get them in front of me. For four which is account activity, and five which is account funding and invoices, et cetera, you only want those for the period in question.

MS. MATCHISON: Yes.

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THE COURT: And for chain splitting and the results of the related transactions, the production of the transaction log is sufficient for the United States?

MS. MATCHISON: I believe that information will be reflected in the transaction information.

THE COURT: Okay. And in terms of --

MS. MATCHISON: Correct me if that's wrong.

THE COURT: Oh, I don't -- that's what they said. And that's what -- well, I don't know. What you said in your brief is we'll look at that, what they've got in the transaction log.

So in terms of the HashID and the blockchain address, the service is happy to have that delivered after Kraken finishes backfilling this information in the transaction log?

MS. MATCHISON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And I take it Kraken does not object, other than at the high level we talked about before, to the production of the transaction ledgers which apparently, from your description, also include funding information. Is that right?

MR. FONDO: Well, they include deposits, withdrawals, trades, and transfers.

THE COURT: Right. So deposits and transfers may be funding information. But to that extent, you're not objecting

to it other than at the high level we talked about at the beginning of this argument, to the production of --

MR. FONDO: So just --

THE COURT: -- transaction ledgers.

MR. FONDO: So just to be clear, though, funding information, the IRS has asked for a bunch of information that might fall in the bucket of funding information like the source of the bank, things like that. That --

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. FONDO: -- we (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Understood. In connection with four and five, you're not objecting to the production of transaction ledgers other than on the high level we talked about before.

MR. FONDO: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So, and then my view, and I'll give you a chance to address it, is that -- and I've had, you know, at least some experience in this, is the HashID and the blockchain address are useful and perhaps the only way to trace crypto transactions. And the production of that, it seems to me, would be extremely useful. But I'm happy to have you, if you want to argue about that, Mr. Fondo, I'm happy to hear about what you want to say about that.

MR. FONDO: Sure. I would make two points, Your Honor.

One is that I don't think they -- they matter when you're

trying to chase funds. They don't necessarily matter when you

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have all this other information to determine whether there's a potential tax implication in that. So I think it's part of step two.

The other thing I would say is we don't have that capability now. I don't know when Kraken will have it. It's based on our latest information and as we disclosed in the declaration, we're talking months before it happens, and it may never happen. Nor do I know necessarily that it can be transferred globally versus on an individual basis. So I have a lot of reservations about that additional information.

THE COURT: Well, when you say they're trying to backfill, what do you mean?

MR. FONDO: Well, they're trying to be able to track that information and record it with accounts. But I'm not aware that they're trying -- they're doing it in a way that will allow it to be globally retrieved in a manner that is connected to every single transaction and connected to every single user.

So for example, if you go and look at a user and you say we want to look at Grant Fondo's account, I think they potentially, if they ever get to this point, may be able to track some of my transactions and my HashIDs. But it's very different to say we need 59,000 of them applied to every single user and the correct user and the correct transaction.

I'm not aware -- again, it's being developed. But I'm

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not aware that it's being built in that manner where it can be retrieved in that manner.

THE COURT: Well, okay. And I appreciate that. Well, I tell you, you know, it is -- I think that I'm likely to order it if it can be retrieved. You know, like it's going to become part of the transactional ledger will now have that sort of material in it, then it's going to be retrieved for a user. So I'm likely to order that, depending on what happens.

I take it -- so what I will have to check on that status and see what's being developed, and I probably will want some more information about what's being developed and the timeline and that sort of thing at some point. But maybe we'll set a status conference on this.

MS. MATCHISON: Your Honor, I would just note that on the -- I believe under the money transmitter regulations, those are the FinCEN regulations that implement the BSA, the Bank Secrecy Act, that that type of information should be, you know, retained and producible to the Government upon demand. So I would hope that it would be not too much of a burden to Kraken to retrieve that information and produce it.

THE COURT: Well, it has -- to me, it's a balance, right?

It's an over breadth question. It is useful in figuring out

the history of a transaction, where it came from, where it

went to, all that kind of stuff, all of which, you know, I

think at some point the United States may be able to justify

needing that.

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If it's relatively easy to do now, that more persuades me that it's worth doing now as opposed to making you go through the first step and then narrow it to the individual, to the users that you really want to focus on because you don't have enough information. That's the question for me is about over breadth and when, or whether it has to be in the second, whether, you know, you're ultimately entitled to it. It may be at a different phase. So this is really about whether I included it in this phase.

And so I'm not -- regardless of their obligation, or in view of their obligation that you mentioned, even. So I don't know that it necessarily -- so I have one other question.

MR. FONDO: Your Honor, if I could, could I address that last point because it's --

THE COURT: Yeah. Sure.

MR. FONDO: So this is a business decision being made that they have decided to track this information. I'm very concerned about an order that in many ways implies you have to continue to do this. If we have obligations under other regulators, BSA, et cetera, of course we're going to, you know, that's a different issue.

But I don't -- and I don't know that the BSA regulations require -- let me stop there. We're talking about 59,000.

I'm not talking about one-off users. We're talking about

59,000 in this first wave. So I'm concerned that any order would in any way imply that they have to continue to build something that does not exist because there are business — there are other reasons — whatever reasons they're doing it for, it's not to comply with this subpoena, this summons.

And —

THE COURT: No, no. I understand that. My question is when and whether I make them produce it. And one of the Government's arguments, and I hadn't intended in this order to say thou shalt develop this capability. However, it is at some point useful. And one of my -- the question that the Government raises is interesting. Don't you have an obligation to keep this information and produce it to the Government and remand it under the Bank Secrecy Act.

MR. FONDO: So I think it is a different scenario where it is a one-off aspect versus a global aspect.

THE COURT: What do you mean? Why?

MR. FONDO: Well, because usually when you get a -- and again, I'm not pretending to be the world's Bank Secrecy Act expert. But usually when you get requests from the -- John Doe summons is a very unusual provision. Right? Most of the time when the Government acts, they act and they issue a subpoena and they say there are three accounts we're interested in. Or we're interested in this user, and get us that information.

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I think that's very different than saying get us all of it for 59,000 people. And you most likely, particularly where you have to go user by user by user by user to extract that information. It's not extractable by, like, in this global way such as emails are.

That's my biggest concern, Your Honor. So I don't think the BSA requires you to have a setup where you have to globally pull 59,000 users at the same time. And this is not the BSA. So we're talking about the IRS, and it's a John Doe summons.

THE COURT: So let me ask Counsel for the United States to cite to us the regulation that requires Kraken to maintain this particular information and produce it on demand.

MS. MATCHISON: Yes, Your Honor. So that can be found in the CFR. And I believe it's CFR Sections 1010.100, subsection (ff)(5), 1010.410, 1022.210. These are actually also in the declaration appearance, the first one that can be found at ECF 1-1, Paragraph 62 through 67, if that's easier.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, to put you at ease, I would have no intention at this point of ordering it. You're doing it for your own business reasons. I think that one of those business reasons would be so that you could actually have those for use by your customers and by the company.

And that, you know, that capability to pull that stuff out, and whether I make you do it for if you have to go user

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by user for 59, we're going to save that for another day. But we're going to keep an eye on what you're doing to do it. And just in terms of those statutes, Ms. Matchison, is what is the particular information that you think they're required to maintain under the Bank Secrecy Act and those regulations?

MS. MATCHISON: So they need to retain the name and address of the transmitter, the amount, the execution date, any payment instructions, the recipients' financial institution, the name and address of the recipient, account number of the recipient, and any other specific identifier of the recipient.

And then if the sender is not an established customer, they have some additional obligations. But basically, the information, the kind of address type information that you'd be looking for.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that. They have address information for all these people. And they got name information. This is and transaction information. You're going to get a transaction log.

What in the regulations specifically requires them to, in addition to the information that they have and that I'm going to order them to provide to you, they have to have the HashID for a transaction, or the, you know, the blockchain address for the participants, or for the transaction? What -- that's just showing my ignorance about the way it works, right.

Where's the regulation that they have to get every single kind of identifying information so that those might be swept in? They certainly aren't included specifically in the regulations.

MS. MATCHISON: Well, right. So two things. First, the regulations are addressed through a money transmitter which they are a money transmitter, and they've been registered as a money transmitter. So that's applicable to them. And so although it doesn't say, you know, transaction ID or transaction HashID or blockchain address, you know, that's the closest there. And my point on --

THE COURT: Why do you think that's closest? I mean, closest in what sense? You read me what the regulation says. The regulation doesn't say every single identifying remark, does it?

MS. MATCHISON: No. It --

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THE COURT: Everything --

MS. MATCHISON: It includes name and address. And so certainly --

THE COURT: Well, we've got names and addresses.

MS. MATCHISON: I mean the blockchain address, Your Honor, not the physical address.

THE COURT: No, I appreciate that. But we've got names and addresses of the users who are engaging in the transaction. Right? They have those.

MS. MATCHISON: Well, the blockchain address is an alphanumeric sequence that includes information about the sender's and receiver's address. That's what I'm talking about.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MATCHISON: And my only point I'm raising this is more to the burden arguments, just more that it's foreseeable that at some point they would have to have this information at hand to produce in response to a government demand than anything else. It really goes to the burden point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, that may be true. But also the burden point, what that informs me about is the timing, is you know, well, you're going to get a lot of information. And the significance for your investigation, which is not a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. It is a violation of the Internal Revenue code.

MS. MATCHISON: Yeah.

THE COURT: Maybe at a later point in the investigation where you narrow it to the people who you're really concerned about, and for whom that information is necessary for you to evaluate whether or not there's a violation of the Internal Revenue code. So not --

MS. MATCHISON: I mean, I do think --

THE COURT: It's really about timing.

MS. MATCHISON: That information that was crucial for the IRS to receive, the purpose of the summons is not just to identify these users or these U.S. persons who transacted in cryptocurrency, but also to determine the correct federal income tax liability. And so to the extent that we need to figure out where the money is coming from, not the money, the cryptocurrency is coming from and where it's going, this is crucial information for the IRS to have.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, it may not be crucial yet. Did you want to respond to that last bit, Mr. Fondo?

MR. FONDO: Not unless you have any additional questions.

THE COURT: No. Okay. Anything else anyone wants to say before I take this under submission?

MR. FONDO: Yes, Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. FONDO: So, Your Honor, one of the concerns we have here is that I know you are trying -- it sounds like you're trying to do some form of enforcement, limine in some ways, two step process. What I would say, Your Honor, is that we think this summons has gone beyond what is appropriate. We think it is unreasonable and unenforceable because of the over breadth of it and the disproportionality of it.

There was an order that the Government, in their declaration effectively admits that the Coinbase order worked. We were able to track just about everybody in it. It was a

little bit more convenient, obviously, to get some of this information, of course.

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But they also didn't use a lot of this information. They wouldn't have used a lot of this information because they were only targeting certain types of users, those users that they think may not have complied with the tax laws.

So my concern is that you have a company and other companies in the future that even though there's an order that worked perfectly and there's no evidence that Coinbase has additional information that was somehow withheld on the 750, but even if you got 99 percent, that's a pretty darn good hit rate, that we have a situation where a company has to spend a lot of money and time trying to narrow this and oppose it, and both in engineer time and as well as employee time as well as legal fees.

And we think that taking something that has worked really well and trying to expand it dramatically like they have is abusive under this situation. And so we would ask Your Honor to actually deny the petition in its entirety, which we think the Court has its authority to do.

THE COURT: Okay. You want to respond to that,

Ms. Matchison, or say anything?

MS. MATCHISON: Certainly, Your Honor. The Government doesn't believe that this should be denied in its entirety.

And to the extent that the Court does have issues with some of

the requests, I can certainly pare them back as Your Honor is well aware.

I do think that, you know, again, the IRS did leave money on the table in Coinbase. It wasn't a perfect result. And there are \$100 million in gross proceeds that the IRS couldn't determine whether there was a tax consequence. And so --

THE COURT: Why didn't you issue a further summons in that case?

MS. MATCHISON: Your Honor, I don't have a good answer for you on that right now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MATCHISON: But I also just want to say that I do not believe that this summons is a dramatic expansion. I get it that the John Doe class is larger. But the information asked for is not a dramatic expansion from Coinbase.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you all. I appreciate all the information, I appreciate all the time you spent this morning on this. We'll take it under submission. I don't think I'm going to require -- well, let me just look at my notes and see what, if I need supplemental briefing. I guess I need some -- well, no. I don't. I don't think I'm going to take supplemental briefing.

All right. Thank you very much.

MS. MATCHISON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll stand in recess.

69 1 MR. FONDO: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 THE CLERK: Court stands in recess. 3 (Proceedings adjourned at 11:22 a.m.) ---000---4 5 6 7 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER 8 I, DIPTI PATEL, certify that the foregoing is a true and 9 correct transcript, to the best of my ability, of the above 10 pages of the official electronic sound recording provided to me by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 11 12 California of the proceedings take on the date and time 13 previously stated in the above-entitled matter. 14 I further certify that I am neither counsel for, related 15 to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which 16 this hearing was taken. I further certify that I am not financially nor otherwise 17 18 interested in the outcome of the action. 19 Dipti Patel 20 21 22 DIPTI PATEL, CET-997 23 LIBERTY TRANSCRIPTS Date: June 16, 2023 2.4 25